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Can the conception of a child ever constitute damage recoverable in 
law? This article considers the liability of healthcare practitioners for 
failing to prevent a pregnancy. Developments leading to the recogni-
tion of wrongful pregnancy as a cause of (legal) action in South Africa 
(SA), are briefly outlined. The salient points of the relevant judg-
ments by our courts are set out to expose the rationale underlying the 
judgments and to highlight that recognition of liability for wrongful 
pregnancy resulted from an application of fair and equitable prin-
ciples of general application. Conduct that could expose practitioners 
to liability is identified from reported cases and inferred from general 
principles laid down in case law. 
For current purposes, wrongful pregnancy may be defined as a 
situation in which a child is conceived to a parent or parents who had 
received negligent advice or treatment from an expert aimed at and 
expected to prevent a pregnancy or aimed at confirming the parent’s 
or parents’ inability to procreate.[1] The legal action is instituted 
against the expert – usually a medical practitioner – whose negligent 
treatment or advice causally contributed to the pregnancy. 
Choice and responsibility
We live in a time of increased difficulty in conceiving, and one in 
which assisted reproduction has developed into a huge and profitable 
industry. Conversely, our age is also one of a world facing overpopula-
tion, in which contraceptive measures play a role in avoiding the ills of 
overpopulation and the alleviation of poverty. Owing to huge scientific 
advances, we now have more options with regard to procreation than 
ever before. For example, the development of contraceptive measures 
brought the possibility of avoiding procreation, where procreation 
would be economically devastating to the parents. The question arose 
whether a person can be held liable for frustrating such a decision to 
prevent a pregnancy. At the time when humankind lacked the know-
how and ability to manipulate their procreative functions, the law was 
silent. The choices that were opened up through science brought with 
them responsibilities, and the law has assumed much greater signifi-
cance in regulating reproduction. The right to make decisions regard-
ing reproduction is now entrenched in the SA Constitution.[2] 
The medical profession plays an important role in ensuring the 
realisation of this right. Those using contraceptives expect these 
products to be free from defects and safe for use, and they will use 
them under expert medical guidance in the hope of effectively avoid-
ing pregnancy.[1] Most literate persons will know that contraceptive 
methods are not foolproof and the possibility of failure could be 
anticipated. In the event of a pregnancy, despite the use of contracep-
tives, it would be very difficult to prove a causal connection between 
any act or omission on the part of any one person and the resultant 
pregnancy.[1]
The chances of successfully laying the blame for an unwanted 
pregnancy on a medical practitioner are much larger where the 
latter is approached for sterilisation. Here the intention is clearly to 
avoid pregnancy at all cost; the person who undertakes to render 
the sterilisation service is easily identifiable and clearly bears the 
responsibility of exercising reasonable care and applying reason-
able skill to ensure success (see Definitions of concepts below).[1] 
However, it does not automatically follow that a medical practi-
tioner who renders such services, necessarily and by implication, 
warrants the success of the procedure.[3] In the case of a vasectomy, 
for instance, the patient’s ejaculate may still contain sperm for a 
considerable time after the procedure. In roughly 1/80 000 cases, 
a man may even father a child despite the apparent absence of 
sperma tozoa in his ejaculate.[4,5] Thus, for instance, a case occurred 
in the UK, where a woman fell pregnant while her husband pro-
duced persistently negative seminal specimens.[1,6,7] However, it 
remains the responsibility of the practitioner to ensure that the 
patient is properly informed of such risks, including the possibil-
ity of conception despite the operation ‘due purely to the vagaries 
of nature’,[7] as well as of the modus operandi for establishing or 
confirming sterility.
Practitioners are often consulted for expert advice on reproductive 
health. A patient may want to know whether he or she would be 
able to have children, or whether there is any medical reason for 
not conceiving, despite sexual intercourse without contraceptives. 
Here, negligence in the performance of the indicated tests, handling 
specimens, failure to do such tests as are necessary to establish 
sterility, or even a misrepresentation that the patient is indeed 
incapable of procreating, may easily lead to a pregnancy that, if not 
unwanted, was at least beyond the parents’ contemplation. In this 
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kind of situation – just as in the case of a failed sterilisation – the party 
responsible is readily identifiable and can easily be called to account.
Definitions of concepts
As it is possible to base a claim for wrongful pregnancy on either 
contract or delict, it is apposite to explain these concepts. In the 
normal course of events, health practitioner and patient would 
enter into a contract[1] for the provision of contraceptive services, 
whether it be the prescription, dispensing or placement of oral 
contraceptives, hormonal injections, implants, vaginal rings, intra-
uterine devices, or the performance of a vasectomy, tubal ligation or 
other sterilisation procedure. Most often, the terms of the contract 
include the provision of contraceptive advice, either in conjunc-
tion with the foregoing, or independently. Ordinarily, the contract 
for the provision of contraceptive services is not required to be 
in writing.[8] In the case of surgical sterilisation, however, written 
consent is required,[9] and a form is prescribed for the purpose of 
obtaining consent. The written consent form furnishes proof of the 
existence of a contract between medical practitioner and patient. It 
is an implied term of the contract between doctor and patient that 
the doctor will exercise such professional skill, competence and 
judgment as the reasonable practitioner of his/her branch of the 
profession possesses, and will treat the patient with the care that 
may reasonably be expected from such a practitioner.[10] A medical 
practitioner who fails to perform in accordance with an express or 
implied term of a contract commits breach of contract. Hence, fail-
ure to measure up to the standard of reasonable care would amount 
to a breach of contract.[10-12] It is, however, also a general principle of 
SA law that a contract that is contrary to public policy (contra bonos 
mores) is unenforceable.[12]
A patient’s ability to institute legal action against a medical 
practitioner does not depend on the existence of a contract. It is 
a general principle of SA law that a legal obligation arises where a 
person, through his/her (i) conduct, (ii) wrongfully and (iii) culpa bly 
(i.e. negligently or intentionally), (iv) causes (v) harm to another.[12,13]
Provided all five the abovementioned elements can be proved, the 
conduct constitutes a delict (civil wrong) in SA law. When interpret-
ing negligence, our courts also have regard to the standard of skill and 
care possessed and exercised by the reasonable practitioner belonging 
to the defendant’s particular branch of the profession. Hence, it is 
evident that a medical practitioner can incur liability based either on 
breach of contract or delict if he/she fails to exercise reasonable care 
and/or apply reasonable skill in providing contraceptive services. 
The types of loss or damages that can result from the kind of 
conduct under consideration, can be categorised as either patrimo-
nial or non-patrimonial in nature. Patrimonial loss is a calculable 
monetary loss or decrease in the plaintiff ’s patrimony (estate), i.e. a 
loss or reduction in value of a positive asset in the plaintiff ’s estate, or 
the creation or increase of a negative element of his/her estate (i.e. a 
debt).[13] Pure economic loss is damage of a patrimonial nature that is 
not the result of physical injury, personality impairment, or damage 
to property.[13] Non-patrimonial loss, on the other hand, is a harm-
ful change in, or factual disturbance of, a person’s legally protected 
personality interests (e.g. physical-mental integrity, dignity, privacy, 
feelings), which change or disturbance does not affect the person’s 
economic position.[13]
Development in SA law
The courts have had the opportunity on a number of occasions to 
consider liability for wrongful pregnancy. Through their judgments 
they laid down the law and created precedents. The development of 
SA law on wrongful pregnancy is traced in the three subsections below.
Pregnancy after vasectomy: Behrmann v Klugman[14]
The plaintiffs were the parents of a normal child conceived and 
born after the defendant, a surgeon, had performed a vasectomy on 
the father. Their action was based upon alleged breach of contract, 
and alternatively, delict. They contended that the surgeon had failed 
to advise the child’s father to have a sperm count before resuming 
intercourse without contraception. They alleged that the surgeon 
had made certain statements that caused them to believe that the 
vasectomy would render the man sterile after 10 weeks. The doctor 
testified that it was his practice to warn patients not to engage in 
unprotected intercourse before he had declared the man sterile, and 
that it could take up to 9 months to obtain two negative sperm counts. 
On the facts before the court it found in favour of the surgeon. The 
court was not convinced that the plaintiffs had really believed that 
sterility would be achieved after 10 weeks, as they had waited much 
longer before resuming intercourse without contraception. The 
court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the contract 
between them and the doctor contained an express or implied term 
or warranty regarding the permanent success of the operation.
In view of the court’s finding on the facts, it was unnecessary to 
consider the more fundamental question, i.e. whether recognition 
of this type of claim would be contra bonos mores. Although the 
plaintiffs’ claim was rejected, the judgment did not exclude the 
possibility that a claim for wrongful pregnancy could succeed where 
the facts support such an action. Taking into account subsequent 
case law (as discussed below), in which it was held that this type of 
action is not contra bonos mores, it is conceivable that such claim will 
succeed if the plaintiff can prove that he was not properly informed 
of, for example, the necessity of first establishing sterility before 
resuming unprotected intercourse or the risks of recanalisation of the 
vas deferens. The case further illustrates the importance of keeping 
proper records, also of the information given to the patient.
Recognition of contractual liability for failure to 
per form a tubular ligation: The Edouard case[15]
The facts giving rise to the claim
In this case, the court had to decide whether the action for wrongful 
conception/pregnancy was contra bonos mores, as it was beyond 
dispute that the agreed-upon procedure, a tubal ligation, was never 
performed. The defendant had contracted with the plaintiff and 
his wife to perform a tubal ligation on the woman at the time of 
giving birth by caesarean section to her third child. Believing that 
the sterilisation procedure had been performed, the couple took 
no precautions to prevent pregnancy, and the woman fell pregnant 
4 months after the birth of her third child. The tubal ligation was 
eventually performed at the woman’s insistence when the fourth child 
was born.
The damages claimed
The child's father brought action for damage allegedly suffered in 
consequence of breach of contract. He claimed: (i) the cost of the 
tubal ligation eventually performed on his wife; (ii) the cost of main-
taining the child from her birth until she attains the age of 18 years; and 
(iii) non-patrimonial damages for the discomfort, pain and suffering, 
and a loss of amenities of life suffered by his wife in consequence of 
the pregnancy and the birth of the child by caesarean section. The 
defendant conceded that it was liable for damages for breach of con-
tract as a result of its failure to effect the tubular ligation that had been 
agreed upon, but contended that payment of the cost of the tubal 
ligation would discharge its liability.
It is important to note that the parties were in agreement that, to 
their knowledge, the reason for seeking a tubal ligation was that the 
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plaintiff and his wife could not afford to support more children.[15] It 
was also common cause that the plaintiff and his wife would not have 
agreed to give the child born as a result of the failure to perform the 
sterilisation out for adoption.[15]
The defendant denied liability for the cost of raising the child on 
the grounds that although the contract for the woman’s sterilisation 
was valid and enforceable and in itself not contrary to public policy, 
it would nonetheless be contrary to public policy to allow the parents 
of a healthy and normal but unplanned child to recover such costs 
where the parents refuse to give the child out for adoption.[15] The 
argument was that in assessing such damages the court is called upon 
to decide whether a pecuniary value can be placed on a healthy life. 
It was argued that it would run counter to the sanctity of human life 
for a court to have to hold that the cost of maintaining a healthy child 
could constitute damage or injury to the parents.
The judgment by the Durban and Coast Local Division of the 
Supreme Court
The court was at pains to explain that contractual liability for this 
type of claim is in accordance with the general principles of our 
law. A court will only depart from the general principles regarding 
liability if there are public policy considerations that are so cogent 
as to justify a modification of or exception to the general principles: 
‘Courts of law will be reluctant to discover new principles of morality 
or considerations of expediency and policy on which to invalidate 
contracts which on accepted legal principles would be valid, because 
it is a fundamental principle of our law as well (a principle which is 
itself based on public policy) that contracts which have been freely 
and seriously entered into should be enforced.’[15]
Unable to find public policy considerations cogent enough to justify 
an exception to or modification of the general principles, the court 
rejected the defendant’s contentions. In its judgment the court said that it 
‘is part of the parental instinct to accept and love, and care for, a child – 
even an unplanned one’, and there is ‘nothing inconsistent in the attitude 
of the parents if they were to say that they had not wanted another child 
but that now that the child has been born they love it and refuse to part 
with it’.[15] However, because of the breach of contract, the parents now 
face the dilemma that they had sought to avoid with the sterilisation 
operation, i.e. having a child whom they are unable to support.
Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the relief sought, 
with the exception of the claim for non-patrimonial loss ((iii) above). 
After a thorough examination of the common law, case law and 
legal opinion, the court concluded that non-patrimonial loss was 
not recoverable for breach of contract, and refused to follow the 
lead given by courts in the UK, where such damages can indeed 
be claimed on contract.[15] The court pointed out that in the case of 
a breach of contract resulting in bodily injuries, there would be a 
concurrent claim for damages in delict in every case where the breach 
was wrongful and accompanied by fault (intention or negligence) 
on the part of the defaulting party.[15] As a delictual claim can easily 
be conjoined with a contractual claim in the case of concurrent 
liability, the court refused to extend liability in contract to non-
patrimonial loss.[15] However, in the case at hand, a delictual claim 
was not conjoined and, therefore, non-patrimonial loss could not be 
recovered.
Arguments raised on appeal to the Appellate Division, and the 
court’s answers to these
Edouard’s case was taken on appeal to the Appellate Division, where 
it was heard by a five-judge bench (Table 1).
The Appellate Division’s judgment
The Appellate Division unanimously confirmed the judgment of the trial 
court and the judgment was reported as Administrator, Natal v Edouard.[16]
The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court’s refusal to 
award non-patrimonial damages for the woman’s pain and suffering, 
as the claim was brought in contract, and non-pecuniary loss cannot 
be recovered in contract.[16] As a general rule, such damages can be 
claimed on the basis of negligence in delict. However, the Appellate 
Division was not convinced that the facts agreed upon in this case 
could find a claim for pain and suffering. The court remarked obiter 
that it may be questioned whether neglect leading to conception and a 
consequent birth could be equated with the inflicting of a bodily injury.[16] 
An obiter remark does not have binding force in law, as it represents 
an opinion uttered in a judgment on a matter that is not essential to 
reaching a decision. Note also that the Appellate Division did not reject 
the notion that conception and birth could be equated to the inflicting 
of a bodily injury, but merely indicated that it may be open to attack. 
Table 1. Arguments raised on appeal in Edouard, and the Appellate Division’s answers to these
Appellant’s argument Court’s pronouncement in answer to appellant’s argument
The birth of a normal, healthy child cannot be regarded as a legal 
wrong against its parents[16]
The wrong is not the unwanted birth as such, but the prior breach of 
contract that led to financial loss[16]
The financial burden of having to maintain a child is outweighed by 
the benefits of parenthood (the birth of a child is a blessed event)[16]
Although tangible benefits accruing as a result of a breach of contract 
or the commission of a delict must be set off against the gross loss 
suffered by a plaintiff, there is no basis in SA law that the non-
pecuniary benefits must be brought into account[16]
It would be highly undesirable for any child to learn that a court 
has publicly awarded damages to his parents because his birth was a 
mistake[16]
The possibility that a child will learn later in his life about such a 
judgment is rather remote. Once it is recognised in our law that this 
type of claim is well founded, relatively few cases of this nature will go 
to court. In any event, a child who is not given up for adoption ceases 
to be unwanted. Only the additional financial burden caused by its 
birth remains unwanted[16]
The award of damages will transfer the obligation to support and 
maintain the child from its parents to the defendant. This runs coun-
ter to public policy, which demands that there be no interference with 
the sanctity accorded by law to the relationship between parent and 
child[16]
This is a fallacious argument. The award of damages does not 
extinguish the parents’ obligation to maintain the child, but at best 
enables them to fulfil it. For example, should the award be made and 
the money be stolen, the parents will remain obliged to support the 
child[16]
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The court’s obiter remark does no more than raise some doubt as to the 
likelihood of a claim for non-patrimonial damages succeeding in delict.
The court qualified the applicability of its judgment by stating 
that the finding that the claim of wrongful pregnancy was admissible 
was intended to pertain only to a case where, as here, a sterilisation 
procedure was requested and performed for socioeconomic reasons. The 
Appellate Division agreed[16] with the trial court’s caution that ‘[d]ifferent 
considerations might well apply where the consideration influencing the 
decision to have the operation was not an economic one’.[15]
Recognition of delictual liability for misrepresentation 
leading to pregnancy: Mukheiber v Raath[17]
In Mukheiber v Raath[17] the plaintiff instituted a delictual action against 
the doctor in circumstances where no agreement had ever been 
reached that the doctor would perform a sterilisation on the patient.[17] 
Liability founded on contract was, therefore, out of the question.
The facts giving rise to the claim
A married woman and her husband claimed damages from a 
gynaecologist following the birth of a normal child. The gynaecologist 
had attended to two previous pregnancies of the woman. During the 
latter of these pregnancies, the woman visited the gynaecologist a 
number of times for routine antenatal consultations.[17] In the course 
of one of these visits, they agreed that the gynaecologist would deliver 
the baby that the woman was carrying at the time by way of caesarean 
section some 11 days later. During the same consultation, the question 
of a sterilisation arose when the woman told the gynaecologist that 
she did not wish to fall pregnant again. The gynaecologist required 
the woman to discuss the matter with her husband and to convey 
their decision to him at their next consultation.[17] The woman did 
not discuss the matter with her husband that evening and went into 
spontaneous labour early the next morning. The baby was delivered 
by the gynaecologist by way of emergency caesarean section. It was 
common cause that the parties had never agreed on sterilisation and 
the gynaecologist never performed one.[17]
Six days after the caesarean section, the woman accompanied by 
her husband visited the gynaecologist for the removal of the sutures. 
The parties’ versions of what was said in the course of that visit 
differed completely.[17] The plaintiffs averred that, having removed 
the sutures, the gynaecologist called the patient’s husband into the 
surgery and told them that ‘he had performed a sterilisation on 
[the patient], that she was now a “sports model”, and that they did 
not need to worry about contraception’.[17] The defendant disputed 
the plaintiffs’ version. The trial court could not decide which of the 
versions was more probable and therefore found that the plaintiffs 
had not acquitted themselves of the onus of establishing that the 
defendant made the alleged misrepresentation.[17] On appeal to a full 
court of the Cape High Court, the trial court’s judgment was reversed. 
The gynaecologist then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The damages claimed
The plaintiffs’ claim was based on delict. They alleged that the gynaeco-
logist’s negligent conduct (the negligent misrepresentation) had caused 
them damages in the form of pure economic loss when, relying on the 
misrepresentation, they failed to take contraceptive measures and a child 
was conceived and born. They claimed compensation for: (i) con-
finement costs; and (ii) maintenance of the child until he becomes 
self-supporting.[17] Non-patrimonial damages were not claimed.
The judgment by the Supreme Court of Appeal
The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with the full court’s finding 
that the probabilities favoured the plaintiffs’ version, i.e. that the 
gynaecologist had made the misrepresentation (i.e. that the patient 
had been sterilised).[17]
Regarding the element of unlawfulness, the court stated that 
the test in the context of misrepresentation was whether, in the 
particular circumstances, the defendant had a legal duty to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the representation was correct before 
making it.[17] In this particular case, the following circumstances 
were held to indicate the existence of such a duty: the doctor-patient 
relationship that existed between the parties required the defendant 
to be careful and accurate; the objectively material nature of the 
representation (carrying the real, objective risk of the conception 
of an unwanted child) and the subjectively material nature of the 
representation (the dangers of a false representation should have 
been obvious to a gynaecologist in the defendant’s position); the 
misrepresentation inducing the plaintiff and her husband not 
to take contraceptive care; that it must have been obvious to the 
defendant that the plaintiffs would rely on what he tells them; 
and the representation related to technical matters concerning a 
surgical procedure about which lay people would be ignorant and 
the defendant knowledgeable.[17]
As far as the element of negligence was concerned, the court found 
that the defendant should reasonably have foreseen the possibility 
that his representation could cause damage to the plaintiffs and 
should have taken reasonable steps to guard against such occurrence. 
As he failed to take such steps, his conduct was negligent.[17]
The court concluded that the defendant factually caused the 
damages claimed: had it not been for his misrepresentation, the 
plaintiffs would have taken contraceptive measures, and the child 
would probably not have been conceived and born.[17] However, 
the defendant contended that his liability should be limited by the 
mechanism of legal causation in terms of which damages that are too 
remote cannot be recovered.[17] The court found that the yardstick to 
be applied in determining the extent of the liability (i.e. the limitation 
of liability so as to exclude excessively remote damages) is that of 
public policy.[17] The public policy considerations that underlie the 
judgment in Administrator, Natal v Edouard[16] were found to be 
applicable in the case at hand. The court found that the limits of 
liability depend on the same considerations of public policy, whether 
a claim was founded in delict or contract.[17]
The court saw no need for limiting claims, such as those under 
discussion, to cases where the request for sterilisation is made for 
socioeconomic reasons.[17] In this regard, the Mukheiber judgment 
extended the recognition afforded wrongful pregnancy claims 
beyond the circumstances contemplated by the trial court and the 
Appellate Division in Edouard’s case (see The Appellate Division’s 
judgment above). The court went even further and made it clear that 
such claims should not be limited to instances where the request for 
sterilisation was made by a married couple, or to instances where the 
husband had given his consent. In the case at hand, the plaintiffs’ wish 
not to have any more children was motivated by socioeconomic and 
family reasons, which were socially acceptable reasons that could not 
bar them from succeeding with their claim.[17]
As regards the extent of damages claimable, the court held that 
both confinement and maintenance costs were reasonably foreseeable 
and therefore compensable. However, the court placed the following 
limitations on the doctor’s liability: (i) it cannot exceed the parents’ 
obligation to maintain their child ‘according to their means and 
station in life’; and (ii) it lapses when the child is reasonably able to 
support himself.[17]
In light of the above, the court concluded that considerations of 
public policy did not preclude the granting of the relief claimed, and 
dismissed the appeal.
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Summary of principles espoused in case law
The judgment in Behrmann confirmed that:
• in the absence of an express warrantee, a court should be slow to 
find that the contract between doctor and patient contained an 
implied warrantee as to the results of an intended operation – in 
this case a warrantee of infertility.
The judgment in Edouard confirmed that:
• contractual liability can be incurred on the general principles of 
contract law for failing to prevent a pregnancy and resulting birth
• there are no policy considerations cogent enough to justify an 
exception to or modification of the general principles of contract 
in the case of a wrongful pregnancy
• only patrimonial damages can be recovered for a wrongful preg-
nancy resulting if the claim is founded on a breach of contract
• it is questionable whether neglect leading to conception and birth 
could be equated with the inflicting of a bodily injury for which 
compensation may be sought in delict
• the defendant could be liable for the reasonable costs involved in 
raising a child to the age of 18
• there is no duty on the plaintiff to mitigate his/her loss by having 
an abortion or giving the child up for adoption
• the court’s finding that the claim of wrongful pregnancy was admiss-
ible was intended to pertain only to a case where a sterilisation 
procedure was performed for socioeconomic reasons.
The judgment in Mukheiber confirmed that:
• even in the absence of a contract, a patient may recover damages 
for wrongful pregnancy
• liability could be incurred even in the absence of clinical negligence
• liability could be incurred on the basis of a misrepresentation
• the yardstick to be applied in determining the extent of the liability 
(i.e. the limitation of liability so as to exclude excessively remote 
damages) is that of public policy
• the same considerations of public policy apply, whether a claim was 
founded in delict or contract
• there is no reason to limit wrongful pregnancy claims to instances 
where the request for sterilisation was made by a married couple, 
or to instances where the husband had given his consent, or, 
most importantly, to instances where the motive for requesting 
sterilisation was of a socioeconomic nature
• reasonably foreseeable damages can be recovered, but liability is 
limited in the following respects:
–  it cannot exceed the parents’ obligation to maintain their child 
‘according to their means and station in life’
– it lapses when the child is reasonably able to support himself.
In view of the general principles enunciated in our case law, one may 
deduce that the following types of conduct could conceivably give rise 
to an actionable claim for wrongful pregnancy:
• incorrect, inadequate, or lack of preoperative counselling, e.g. on 
the danger of recanalisation of the vas deferens after a vasectomy, 
or of female sterilisation not achieving sterility[3,18]
• failure to perform an agreed sterilisation or other contraceptive measure
• failure to perform a sterilisation properly so as to result in inferti-
lity, e.g. by ligating a ligament rather than a fallopian tube during a 
sterilisation on a woman[18,19]
• misrepresentation that a sterilisation was performed, while it was 
in fact not done
• false assurance that a patient (either before or after sterilisation) is 
infertile, whether it be as a result of negligent testing or negligent 
interpretation of test results[3]
• failure to carry out sperm tests correctly or properly after a vasec-
tomy[19]
• incorrect contraceptive advice leading to pregnancy
• incorrect, inadequate, or lack of postoperative advice, e.g. on the 
need to use contraceptives until sperm tests have proved nega-
tive[3,18,19]
• incorrect positioning of intrauterine contraceptive, resulting in preg-
nancy
• the wrong advice on their chances of having a child with a disability 
deprives the couple of the choice to rather prevent the pregnancy 
than to take the risk of conceiving a child with a disability.
Although there has not yet been a reported case where a claim was 
instituted for the birth of a normal but unwanted child born after, 
and as a result of, a failed abortion, it is conceivable that such a claim 
could also succeed in SA law, provided that the failed abortion was 
one that met the requirements in terms of the Choice on Termination 
of Pregnancy Act.[20] Liability might also follow where medical 
interventions aimed at addressing childlessness or infertility result 
in multiple pregnancies. Prospective parents might be prepared 
and capable of raising one child, but they may not necessarily be 
desirous or prepared and capable of raising more than one child of 
the same age at the same time. It is therefore very important to inform 
prospective parents of the risk of more than one live birth associated 
with such interventions. 
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